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HE 2005 Survey period was marked by both legislative changes
and case-law developments in the area of commercial transactions.
Legislative changes included the amendment of Chapters 3 and 4
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code dealing with negotiable in-
struments, bank deposits, and bank collections, and the complete revision
of Chapter 7 governing warehouse receipts, bills of lading, and other doc-
uments of title.' Most cases reported during the Survey period involved
the sale of goods under Chapter 2 or the application of Chapter 3 in the
context of negotiable instruments. A handful of cases addressed issues
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University.
1. Chapters 3 and 4 were amended by Act of May 17, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 95,§§ 1-22, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 15768, codified as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.§§ 3.101-.605, 4.101-.504 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005). Chapter 7 was amended by Act of
May 20, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 122, §§ 1-33, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 225-56, codified as
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 7.101-.603 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005). Some of the
changes in Chapter 7 required conforming amendments to other Code chapters to reflect
the use of electronic records as documents of title.
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arising under other chapters of the Code. 2 As usual, the organization of
this Survey follows that of the Code.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. CONSPICUOUSNESS OF CONTRACT TERMS
Chapter 1 of the Code was amended in the 2003 legislative session to
reflect the updated official text of Article 1 approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2001. 3 One of
the few non-uniform provisions included in the Chapter 1 amendments
was the retention of the choice-of-law rules in the former section 1.105 in
the renumbered section 1.301. In general, these choice-of-law rules per-
mit the parties to an agreement covered by the Code to choose the law of
any state or nation that has a reasonable relation to the transaction unless
a specific Code provision states a different rule.4 For example, section
1.105 provided that the "reasonable relation" rule did not apply to certain
bank transactions governed by section 4.102. 5
In Drug Test USA, Quick Results, L.L.C. v. Buyers Shopping Network,
Inc.,6 a Texas buyer and a Florida seller entered into a sale-of-goods con-
tract containing a provision selecting Florida law and providing for juris-
diction and venue in the Florida courts. The buyer brought an action
against the Florida seller in the Texas courts, the seller made a special
appearance contesting venue, and the trial court upheld it.7
The buyer appealed, contending that the choice-of-law clause was not
conspicuous and therefore, was not enforceable. Thus, the court had to
address an apparent conflict between the choice-of-law rules in section
1.105 (which the court noted as being renumbered as section 1.301 with-
out substantive change) and the choice-of-law rules in Business & Com-
merce Code section 35.53 requiring that a choice-of-law clause be
"conspicuous."'8 The conflict seemed to exist because section 35.53(a)
2. The Texas enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code is contained in the first
eleven chapters of the Texas Business and Commerce Code (the "Code"). See TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
3. The 2003 Chapter 1 amendments are described in John Krahmer, Commercial
Transactions, 57 SMU L. REV. 699, 700-03 (2004).
4. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301(a) (Vernon 2002).
5. See id. § 1.301(b). Section 4.102 provides that the law of the state where a bank or
branch is located governs "[t]he liability of a bank for action or non-action with respect to
an item handled by it for purposes of presentment, payment, or collection .... " Id.
§ 4.102(b). This limits the parties' ability to choose another jurisdiction's law and effec-
tively supersedes the reasonable-relation test.
6. 154 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet. h.).
7. Id. at 192.
8. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.53(b) (Vernon 2002) provides:
If a contract to which this section applies contains a provision making the
contract or any conflict arising under the contract subject to the laws of an-
other state, to litigation in the courts of another state, or to arbitration in
another state, the provisions must be set out conspicuously in print, type, or
other form of writing that is bold-faced, capitalized, underlined, or otherwise
set out in such a manner that a reasonable person against whom the provi-
sion may operate would notice. If the provision is not set out as provided by
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provided that it applied, inter alia, to any contract for the "sale, lease,
exchange, or other disposition for value of goods for the price, rental, or
other consideration of $50,000 or less" and "Section 1.301 of this Code
does not apply to the contract."9 The buyer contended that applying the
plain meaning of the section 1.105 exclusion would lead to an "absurd
result" because any contract for the sale of goods in an amount less than
$50,000 would never be governed by section 35.53, and this would make
the statute meaningless. 10
In an interesting analysis of the relationship between sections 1.105 and
35.53, the court concluded that the legislative history of section 35.53 in-
dicated an intent to limit the cross-reference to section 1.105 to transac-
tions listed in section 1.105(b) as exceptions to the reasonable-relation
rule in section 1.105(a). Because the transaction between the parties was
not one of the listed exceptions to the reasonable-relation rule, the clause
had to be conspicuous to be enforceable. The seller did not contend that
the clause was conspicuous or that the transaction did not otherwise fall
within the scope of section 35.53, and the court therefore reversed and
remanded for further proceedings."
In another case examining whether a contract clause was conspicuous,
the court recognized that the Texas Supreme Court had adopted the stan-
dard of conspicuousness contained in section 1.201 and made it generally
applicable to all contracts, whether or not otherwise governed by the
Code. 12 The court did not note that the definition of "conspicuous" was
clarified in the Chapter 1 revision to create a "safe harbor" for drafters in
making a clause conspicuous.1 3 This omission, however, would not have
made a difference in the result.
B. ACCELERATION
Although section 1.309 of the Code allows contract acceleration at will,
Texas law has long surrounded acceleration with notice and presentment
this subsection, the provision is voidable by a party against whom it is sought
to be enforced.
9. Section 35.53(a)(3) was amended during the 2005 legislative session to refer to
section 1.301 instead of section 1.105 due to the Chapter 1 amendment, a change that had
been overlooked in the 2003 session. See Act of June 17, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 728,
§ 2.001, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2191. A parallel change was made to section 35.531(e)
governing contracts made over the Internet. See Act of June 17, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch.
728, § 2.002, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2191.
10. Drug Test USA, 154 S.W.3d at 193.
11. Id. at 195-96.
12. ALCOA v. Hydrochem Indus. Servs., Inc., No. 00531, 2005 WL 608232, at *8 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi, Mar. 17, 2005, pet. denied). The Texas Supreme Court announced
that the U.C.C. standard of conspicuousness would be made generally applicable to all
contracts in Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 509-11 (Tex. 1993).
13. The definition of "conspicuous" formerly appeared in TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 1.201(o) (Vernon 1994) but now appears in revised form in TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(10) (Vernon 2002). The revised definition provides specific exam-
ples of ways in which a term can be made conspicuous.
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requirements before it can be effective. 14 These requirements can be
waived, however, provided they separately and specifically state the
rights being waived. 15 In Adams v. First National Bank of Bells/Savoy,16
the court held that a waiver clause in a note was effective because it sepa-
rately and specifically waived the rights of notice and presentment. 17 In
addition, the court rejected an argument that the clause did not waive a
violation of a due-on-sale provision in the deed of trust because it was not
in the same paragraph as the due-on-sale clause. 18 The court construed
the note and deed of trust together because the same parties signed both
on the same day, they identified identical subject matter, and each docu-
ment referenced the other.1 9 The court therefore affirmed the judgment
for the bank that accelerated the note and foreclosed under the deed of
trust.
20
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Chapter 2 of the Code does not attempt to state detailed rules gov-
erning offer and acceptance, deferring instead to common-law principles,
except for a few provisions allowing contract formation in situations in
which a contract may not exist under common law. For example, section
2.204(a) provides that a contract may be made in any manner sufficient to
show an agreement, including conduct by the parties.21 This general state-
ment is qualified, however, by provisions allowing contracts to be formed
even though some terms have been left open, such as price, or allowing
offers to be irrevocable without consideration. In both of these situa-
tions, the common law might deny the existence of a contract. 22
In In re Kyocera Wireless Corp. ,23 the court held that a contract formed
when a buyer placed purchase orders by telephone or electronic commu-
nication and the seller began manufacturing the goods before receiving
written purchase orders. The court reasoned that the conduct of the par-
ties was sufficient to show agreement, and the contract satisfied the stat-
ute of frauds through the "merchant's exception" in section 2.201(b)
when the seller did not object to the written purchase orders that con-
14. See, e.g., Ogden v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233-34 (Tex. 1982) (hold-
ing that proper acceleration requires (1) notice of intent to accelerate, (2) notice of acceler-
ation, and (3) presentment); Baldazo v. Villa Oldsmobile, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
15. See Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. 1991).
16. 154 S.W.3d 859 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
17. Id. at 868.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 878.
21. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.204(a) (Vernon 1994).
22. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE AN. §§ 2.204(c), 2.205, 2.305 (Vernon 1994).
23. 162 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet. h.).
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firmed the earlier oral orders.24 The specific point in issue was the en-
forceability of a forum-selection clause in the buyer's purchase orders
requiring all actions under the contract to be brought in California. Be-
cause the seller failed to object to this clause in the purchase orders and
did not show that the clause seriously inconvenienced its ability to main-
tain the action or violated public policy, the court conditionally granted a
writ of mandamus, pending action by the trial court dismissing the suit in
Texas.25
As noted above, offers for the sale of goods can be irrevocable under
the Code even without consideration.26 Under common law, irrevocable
offers require consideration or, in some instances, the use of promissory
estoppel as a substitute for consideration. 27 Irrevocable offers at common
law are generally referred to as "option contracts" and typically recite the
consideration paid for the option, for example, "In consideration of the
payment of $10.00, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, seller
hereby grants to buyer the right to .... ,,28
Due in part to the Uniform Commercial Code's influence, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts includes a rule that a recital of consideration
in an option contract makes the option enforceable, even if the considera-
tion is not paid.2 9 In 1464-Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich,30 the Texas Supreme
Court adopted this rule, approving the false recital of consideration in an
option contract for the sale of land. In doing so, the court acknowledged
that it was adopting a position rejected by most courts that had consid-
ered the issue. 3 1 Nonetheless, the court was persuaded that this rule made
commercial sense by enforcing option contracts as an initial step in com-
24. Id. at 766-67. The "merchant's exception" in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.201(b) (Vernon 1994) provides that, between merchants, a written confirmation of an
oral agreement satisfies the statute of frauds without a signed writing by the recipient if the
recipient has reason to know of the writing's contents and fails to object to it within ten
days after receipt.
25. Id. at 769. Because the amount in controversy was approximately $250,000, the
issue of whether the clause was conspicuous under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 35.53(a) (Vernon 2002) was not before the court; that section is only applicable in con-
tracts for less than $50,000. See supra text accompanying note 8. The clause in the
purchase orders was in boldface capitals, so the seller may have lost on that issue anyway.
26. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.205 (Vernon 1994) provides that an offer by a
merchant can be made irrevocable without consideration if the offer is in a signed writing
and states that it will be held open for a specific time or, if no time is stated, for a reasona-
ble time. The period of irrevocability cannot exceed three months. Id.
27. Classic cases on this subject include James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344,
346 (2d Cir. 1933) (holding that a subcontractor could revoke a bid absent consideration
keeping the bid open) and Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958) (find-
ing that a general contractor's reliance on a subcontractor's bid estopped the subcontractor
from revoking). Both cases are discussed in some detail in E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS § 3.25 (4th ed. 2004).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: OPTION CONTRACT § 87.1 (1981).
29. Id.




pleting a seriously intended bargain. 32 This is an important development
in Texas law, particularly since, as an aside and perhaps a foreshadowing,
the supreme court noted that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts pro-
vides a similar rule for guaranty agreements.33
B. WARRANTIES
The Texas law of warranty is not limited to issues arising under the
Code but often overlaps with claims based on negligence, strict liability in
tort, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), and common-law
warranties created by the courts.34 Cases reported during the Survey pe-
riod were no exception. In Todd v. Perry Homes,35 the plaintiffs pur-
chased a house from the home's previous owners. After the purchase,
the plaintiffs discovered that improper drainage caused damage to the
home and resulted in substantial repair costs. The plaintiffs sued the
homebuilder, with whom they had not previously dealt, for breach of an
implied warranty of habitability, negligence, construction defect, and un-
conscionable conduct under the DTPA. The Dallas Court of Appeals af-
firmed a summary judgment of the trial court in favor of the builder,
holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the home was not habitable
and that the drainage defect was unknown to them when they bought the
home.36 The court also held that the DTPA claim failed because the
plaintiffs lacked privity with the homebuilder and because the plaintiffs
did not show that the homebuilder made any direct representations to the
plaintiffs about the home's quality.37
In Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider,38 tenants under a commercial
lease sued their landlord for negligence, fraud, DTPA violations, and
breach of the warranty of suitability. The Austin Court of Appeals up-
held a partial summary judgment in favor of the landlord on the ground
that the lease's "as is" clause waived the warranty of suitability and
placed the risk on the tenants that the property might have latent defects
affecting its suitability. 39 The court acknowledged that this result con-
flicted with the Houston and Corpus Christi courts of appeal holdings,
which said that a waiver of the warranty of suitability only waived the
lessor's responsibility for repairs that the lessee accepted as part of the
32. Id. Before reaching this conclusion, the court cited and reviewed several primary
and secondary authorities that discussed why option contracts should be enforceable with-
out the payment of consideration.
33. Id. at 106. The rule concerning guaranty agreements appears in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: GUARANTY § 88(a) (1981).
34. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004); Hyundai
Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1999); Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919
S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1996); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv.,
Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 309-13 (Tex. 1978); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572
S.W.2d 320, 326-29 (Tex. 1978); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1969).
35. 156 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
36. Id. at 921-22.
37. Id. at 922.
38. 158 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. filed).
39. Id. at 88.
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bargain and did not operate as a general waiver of the warranty. 40 In
reaching their conclusion, the Austin court noted that "as is" disclaimers
are effective under the Code and had been held effective for other war-
ranty and DTPA claims as well.
4
'
The seller of hardwood flooring in Thomas v. Omar Investments, Inc.,42
moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for breach of war-
ranty on the ground that the claim lacked supporting evidence because of
a disclaimer in the sales agreement. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the seller, but the court of appeals reversed, pointing out
that a disclaimer is an affirmative defense that could not be properly
raised in a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The case was re-
manded for further proceedings. 43
In Blakeley v. Boltinghouse44 and RT Realty, L.P. v. Texas Utilities
Electric Co.,4 5 the courts determined that no warranties existed to sup-
port the plaintiffs' claims. In Blakeley, the plaintiff alleged a breach of
the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in the sale of a home. The
court held that such a warranty was limited to the sale of goods under
section 2.315 of the Code and did not apply to the sale of a home. 46
Blakeley also held that an "as is" clause in the sales contract was not
effective to defeat the plaintiff's DTPA claim because the clause's lan-
guage did not eliminate the possibility that the seller's alleged misrepre-
sentations were the cause of the plaintiff's damage.47
In RT Realty, the owner of an office building sued an electric-utility
company for breach of warranty and negligence, which resulted in dam-
age that forced a building evacuation and several months of repair. 48
Basing its decision on the earlier Texas Supreme Court case, Southwest-
40. See Parts Indus. Corp. v. A.V.A. Servs., Inc., 104 S.W.3d 671, 679-80 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Gober v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
41. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(c)(1) (Vernon 1994) (regarding "as is"
disclaimers of the warranties contained in sections 2.314 and 2.315). Disclaimers have also
been held effective in warranty and DTPA cases arising outside the Code. See, e.g., Centex
Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266, 274-75 (Tex. 2002) (finding that the implied warranty of
good workmanship can be disclaimed if an agreement provides for manner of performance
or for standard of construction), Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896
S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995) (holding that an "as is" disclaimer places risk of defect on
buyer); Bynum v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 129 S.W.3d 781, 789-90 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (stating that even an inconspicuous "as is" clause is
effective if buyers are experienced real-estate buyers and read the clause when they signed
the agreement); Smith v. Radam, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 413, 416-17 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (finding that an "as is" disclaimer defeats a showing of producing
cause under the DTPA).
42. 156 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
43. Id. at 685.
44. No. Civ.A.H-03-4901, 2005 WL 1185944, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2005).
45. 181 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet. h.).
46. Blakeley, 2005 WL 1185944, at *4. Section 2.315 provides for an implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose if the buyer relies on the seller's skill and judgment in
selecting particular goods to fill the buyer's need. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.315
(Vernon 1994).
47. Blakeley, 2005 WL 1185944, at *3.
48. RT Realty, 181 S.W.3d at 910-11.
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ern Electric Power Co. v. Grant,49 the court held that the "filed rate" doc-
trine prevented recovery for negligence because the utility's filed tariff
limited liability for economic loss and made the owner responsible for
maintenance of electrical equipment and connections existing "at and
past the point of delivery."' 50 As for breach of warranty, the court held
that under Grant and section 2.102 of the Code, Chapter 2 does not cover
the sale of electricity because applying rules governing the sale of goods
would impair the electric utilities' regulatory scheme. 51
C. REMEDIES FOR BREACH
Section 2.607 of the Code requires that an aggrieved buyer give notice
of breach within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should
have discovered any breach. 52 One issue that arises under this provision is
determining what constitutes a "reasonable time." While this is usually a
fact question, it can sometimes be a question of law. In Ketter v. ESC
Medical Systems, Inc.,53 the trial court granted a motion for summary
judgment in favor of a defendant seller who received notice approxi-
mately two years and seven months after the buyer received the equip-
ment, apparently on the basis that this went beyond a "reasonable time."
On appeal, however, the court pointed out that the motion only spoke to
the time between delivery and notice, rather than the time between the
defect's discovery and notice. The question of reasonable time should,
therefore, have been treated as a question of fact. The plaintiff also as-
serted a DTPA claim based on the seller's alleged unconscionable actions,
and the court held that this claim raised issues of material fact. The case
was remanded for trial on the warranty and DTPA issues.54
Another aspect of the section 2.607 notification requirement is which
party or parties must receive notice. There is a conflict in the Texas case
law as to whether notice need be given only to the immediate seller or to
remote sellers as well.55 This issue can be particularly important because
Chapter 82 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code limits the liability of
a non-manufacturing seller for damages resulting from personal injury,
49. 73 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2002).
50. RT Realty, 181 S.W.3d at 913-16.
51. Id. at 917. Section 2.102 provides, inter alia, that Chapter 2 does not "impair or
repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers, or any other specified classes of
buyers." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Vernon 1994).
52. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1) (Vernon 1994).
53. 169 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
54. Id. at 796, 800-02.
55. Compare Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1979, no writ) (requiring notice only to immediate seller) with Wilcox v. Hillcrest
Mem'l Park, 696 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985), writ refd n.r.e., 701 S.W.2d
842, 843 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (requiring notice to remote manufacturer at the lower
court; the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged the split among courts of appeal but held
that it need not resolve the issue on facts before it).
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death, or property damage. 56 Though not directly involving the notice
issue because it was a strict-liability action, the decision in SSP Partners v.
Gladstrong Investments (USA) Corp. is of interest because it deals with
the right of a seller in the distribution chain to obtain indemnity from
manufacturers, parts suppliers, and others higher in the chain. 57 To the
extent that such claims are based on a breach of warranty, the provisions
of section 2.607 would apply, and a failure to comply with the notification
requirement could be fatal to an indemnity claim. The lesson of these
cases is clear: Notice should be given to anyone in the distribution chain
to avoid the possible bar of an initial cause of action or a claim for
indemnity.
Section 2.608(a) of the Code allows a buyer to revoke acceptance of
non-conforming goods under certain circumstances if the non-conformity
substantially impairs the goods' value. 58 If acceptance is properly re-
voked, the buyer can "cover" by making a reasonable substitute
purchase.59 Both of these issues were involved in Manon v. Tejas Toyota,
Inc.,60 in which a husband and wife bought a mini-van. The buyers
wanted a 2000-model vehicle with a certain exterior color, a wood-
grained interior, and a trailer hitch. The dealer was unable to obtain a
2000 model in the desired color and offered to provide a similar 2001
model for the same price. The buyers agreed. Upon delivery, the vehicle
did not have the wood-grained interior or the trailer hitch, but the dealer
assured the buyers that these could be installed at the dealership. Unfor-
tunately, the dealer was not able to install the wood-grained interior, and
the installed trailer hitch had to be removed because of excessive rattling
noise. The dealer offered to refund the value of the missing items and
give the buyers a $1,000 discount off the purchase price of a substitute
vehicle. The buyers refused and traded the vehicle to another dealership
to purchase a 2001-model sport-utility vehicle (SUV). The buyers sued
for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and DTPA violations. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the buyers on the breach-of-con-
tract claim and allowed the misrepresentation and DTPA claims to go to
the jury.6 1 The jury found in favor of the buyers on these claims.
On appeal, the court held that, as a matter of law, the buyers were not
entitled to revoke acceptance because the impairment in value of the
mini-van was only $591, about one percent of the mini-van's total value.62
56. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001-.004 (Vernon 1997). Exceptions
exist for sellers who do not manufacture the product but are involved in product design,
installation, and the like, or who misrepresent the product's characteristics.
57. 169 S.W.3d 27, 35-43 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied).
58. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608(a) (Vernon 1994). Revocation of accept-
ance is allowed if the goods were accepted in the reasonable belief that the non-conformity
would be cured or if the non-conformity's discovery was difficult or induced by the seller's
assurances.
59. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.712 (Vernon 1994).
60. 162 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2005, no pet. h.).
61. Id. at 746.
62. Id. at 748-50.
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The court further held that the SUV purchase for a price of nearly
$10,000 more than that of the mini-van was not a reasonable substitute
purchase. 63 Because the buyers failed to prove proper revocation of ac-
ceptance or a reasonable cover purchase, they were limited to a recovery
of $591 on their contract claim. On the DTPA and misrepresentation
claims, however, the court upheld a jury award of $7,831 for the differ-
ence between the price of the mini-van and the trade-in value, plus an
additional $5,000 exemplary damages award. 64 The judgment of the trial
court was affirmed. 65
In contrast to Manon, the court in A.0. Smith Corp. v. Elbi S.P.A.
6 6
upheld a jury verdict in favor of a buyer who revoked acceptance when it
proved that the interior coating on 14,400 pressure tanks it had purchased
had been defectively applied. The court rejected the seller's argument
that the buyer should have discovered the defects by testing the tanks
when they were received. Because sample tanks the seller provided had
already passed testing, the court held that the buyer had acted reasonably
in deciding to forego further testing, particularly because the only way to
discover the defect was to cut the tanks open (destructive testing). This
was inconsistent with the buyer's purpose of reselling the tanks in resi-
dential-hot water systems. 67 The court also rejected the seller's argument
that the buyer had waived the right to revoke acceptance by selling some
seventy-five tanks out of a total order of 14,400 after sending notice of
revocation. The buyer countered that these sales were de minimus and
inadvertent, and the court agreed that a reasonable jury could find that
these sales did not invalidate the revocation. 68
The opposite side of the coin to allowing a buyer to make a cover
purchase is the seller's right to resell goods if a buyer breaches. 69 Proper
resale requires the seller to refer to the broken contract in the resale con-
tract, to give the defaulting buyer reasonable notice of the proposed re-
sale, and to resell in good faith and in a commercially reasonable
manner. 70 In Piano Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Roberts,71 aggrieved sellers
notified the breaching buyer that the sellers would "'exercise [their] rem-
edies for the buyer's breach pursuant to statute.' "72 The court held that
this statement was insufficient to give the buyer notice of intent to resell
because the sellers had several other remedies available under Chapter 2,
and the notice failed to differentiate between them.73 The failure to give
proper notice meant that the sellers were not entitled to recover the dif-
63. Id. at 749.
64. Id. at 757-58.
65. Id. at 758.
66. 123 F. App'x 617 (5th Cir. 2005).
67. Id. at 621-22.
68. Id. at 620-21.
69. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.706(a) (Vernon 1994).
70. Id. § 2.706(b)-(f).
71. 167 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).




ference between the resale price and the contract price. The sellers ar-
gued that even with this failure, they could elect to recover damages on
the alternative remedy of the difference between the contract price and
the market price. The court ruled that the sellers had waived this alterna-
tive by pleading for damages only on the contract/resale difference. A
take-nothing judgment was rendered against the sellers. 74
D. LIMITATIONS
In Tarrant County Hospital District v. GE Automotive Services, Inc.,75 a
hospital district entered into a contract for the design, supply, and instal-
lation of a power-supply system for a hospital. The contract documents
referred to the subject matter as a "product purchase" for electrical distri-
bution. Five years after the system was installed, the hospital district sued
for alleged defects in the system. The defendant sellers moved for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the four-year limitations period in sec-
tion 2.725 of the Code barred the action. The trial court granted the
summary judgment.76
On appeal, the hospital district contended that it was immune from the
four-year limitations period under the provisions of section 16.061 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 77 The court held that the contract was
for the sale of goods covered by Chapter 2.78 Furthermore, because sec-
tion 16.061 specifically listed the limitation statutes from which govern-
mental entities were immune, and section 2.725 was not among those
listed, the action of the hospital district was barred. 79 As an alternative
cause of action, the hospital district argued that it could maintain its suit
as a tort claim arising within two years of the defect's discovery date. The
court rejected this argument on the ground that the damages sought on a
tort theory were economic losses to the product itself and were not claims
for losses that were independent of the contract.8 0
74. Id. at 624-25.
75. 156 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005) (Rule 53.7(f) motion for extension
granted).
76. Id. at 888-89.
77. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.061(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005-06). This
section exempts the state, counties, and various governmental entities from certain limita-
tion periods that would otherwise bar an action.
78. G.E. Auto. Servs., 156 S.W.3d at 894-95.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 896. The requirement that tort claimants must seek damages other than eco-
nomic damages to the product itself is well settled in Texas law. See, e.g., S.W. Bell Tel. Co.
v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494-95 (Tex. 1991); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil
Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. 1978); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County
Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. 1978); Murray v. Ford Motor Co., 97 S.W.3d






The most important development to Chapters 3 and 4 during the Sur-
vey period was their amendment that bring them into conformity with the
2002 revision of the U.C.C. The following discussion describes the
amendments' principal changes.
The term "record" was substituted in Chapters 3 and 4 for the term
"writing" to permit the use of electronic records as well as writings. This
conforms these chapters to the provisions of the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act adopted in Texas as Chapter 43 of the Business and
Commerce Code.81
A provision was added to section 3.305 preserving the right of an obli-
gor in a consumer transaction to assert claims and defenses against a
holder or transferee even if the Federal Trade Commission "Holder in
Due Course Notice" is omitted from the instrument. 82 This change paral-
lels the rule contained in Chapter 9, section 9.404 for consumer debtors.83
A non-uniform Texas amendment was included to make it clear that a
holder or transferee who is liable to a consumer obligor under this section
has a right to indemnity against a prior party that failed to include the
required FTC notice. 84
Section 3.602, dealing with payment of instruments, was amended to
protect the obligor from double liability in cases in which payment was
made to a prior holder and the obligor was unaware that an instrument
had been transferred.8 5 The amendment provides that payments made to
a prior holder discharge the obligor to the extent of any payments made
before the obligor received notice that the instrument was transferred.8 6
This changes the rule in former section 3.602 and brings it into conformity
with the Restatement of Mortgages and the Restatement of Contracts. 87
The former requirement in section 3.309, that a person seeking to re-
cover on a lost, destroyed, or stolen instrument had to be in possession of
the instrument when it was lost, has been eliminated. This change per-
mits recovery on such an instrument if the person asserting a right to
recovery acquired the instrument from a person who had possession
81. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.106, 3.119, 3.312, 3.602, 3.604, 4.212,
4.301, 4,403 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005). The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ap-
pears as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 43.001-.021 (Vernon 2002).
82. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305(e)(2) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005). The
FTC "Holder in Due Course Notice" provides that the holder of a consumer note is sub-
ject to any claims or defenses that could be asserted against the seller of goods or services
in a consumer transaction. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (2004).
83. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.404(d) (Vernon 2002).
84. See id. § 3.305(f) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
85. See id. § 3.602(b)-(d) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
86. Id.
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 5.5 (1997); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 338(1) (1981).
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when it was lost, destroyed, or stolen.88
Various provisions in Chapters 3 and 4 were amended to more effec-
tively deal with third parties who draw drafts on a bank account and pur-
port to have been given such authorization by the account holder but who
in fact do not have such authority.89 The changes cover transferors and
presenting parties (including collecting banks) who warrant that such
drafts are authorized and permit recovery for breach of warranty if they
are not authorized. 90 A non-uniform Texas variation includes a choice-of-
law provision to protect Texas banks from warranty liability if the bank
does not receive a similar warranty from an out-of-state bank.91 This pro-
vision was deemed necessary because only a few states had adopted the
amended versions of U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 when Texas enacted these
amendments. 92
B. NEGOTIABILITY OF INSTRUMENTS
To be negotiable under section 3.104 of the Code, a note must contain
an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount of money, be payable to
order or to bearer, and be payable on demand or at a definite time.93 If a
note is negotiable, it can be transferred by indorsement, and the note
holder is entitled to enforce it.94 If a note is non-negotiable, it can still be
assigned, but ownership must be proven; until then, the person in posses-
sion is not entitled to enforce the note. 95
In FFP Marketing Co., Inc. v. Long Lane Master Trust /V,96 the court
held that the notes in issue were non-negotiable because the amount pay-
able could not be determined from the notes themselves, and the instru-
88. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.309(a)(1)(B) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
This reverses the result reached by the court in Dennis Joslin Co. v. Robinson Broad.
Corp., 977 F. Supp. 491, 495 (D.D.C. 1997) and is consistent with the proposal to amend
section 3.309 suggested in Timothy R. Zinnecker, Extending Enforcement Rights to Assign-
ees of Lost, Destroyed, or Stolen Negotiable Instruments under U.C.C. Article 3: A Proposal
for Reform, 50 KAN. L. REV. 111, 136-41 (2001).
89. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.103(a)(16), 3.416-.417, 4.207-.208 (Vernon
2002 & Supp. 2005).
90. See id. §§ 3.416-.417, 4.207-.208 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
91. See id. §§ 3.416(e), 3.417(g), & 4.208(g) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
92. The need for this non-uniform provision now seems to have been eliminated by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System that amended Regulation J, 12
C.F.R. § 210, and Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229, which became effective on July 1, 2006.
As preemptive federal regulations, the choice-of-law issue will no longer be of concern
since the regulations will apply uniformly to banks in all jurisdictions. See Fed. Reserve
System Docket No. R-1226 (Nov. 21, 2005).
93. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (Vernon 2002).
94. Id. §§ 3.201, 3.301 (Vernon 2002).
95. See, e.g., Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C.,
99 S.W.3d 349, 357 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (finding no presumption of
ownership upon assignment of non-negotiable note); Dillard v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 815
S.W.2d 356, 360 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ), overruled on other grounds, Amberboy
v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992) (holding that a non-negotiable
note can be transferred by assignment). See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.203
cmt. 2 (Vernon 2002).
96. 169 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
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ments were conditional because the terms of other documents were
incorporated by reference. Because the notes were non-negotiable, the
transferees were required to prove ownership and were subject to any
valid defenses the makers might be able to raise. Summary judgment in
favor of the transferees was reversed, and the case was remanded for
trial.97
In Nelson v. Regions Mortgage, Inc.,98 a note went into default and the
holder sought to foreclose on the mortgage securing the note. The
maker's father purchased the note from the holder by taking an assign-
ment of the mortgage and copies of the note and deed of trust, but he
never received the original documents. Even though the note went into
default, the father as transferee never attempted to enforce the note or
foreclose on the mortgage. He did, however, seek to rescind the purchase
and recover damages from the holder for fraud, DTPA violations, and
breach of contract because he never received the original documents.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the holder, and this
judgment was affirmed on appeal. The court reasoned that even though
the transferee did not qualify as a holder because he did not possess the
original note and mortgage, he could still enforce it by proving owner-
ship. However, because he had not attempted to enforce it, the trans-
feree was not damaged and was not entitled to rescind the transaction or
recover damages from the holder. 99
C. RIGHTS OF HOLDERS AND HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE
In First Commerce Bank v. J.V.3, Inc., 00 a borrower obtained a one-
million dollar loan from a bank in March of 1983. The note was guaran-
teed by several guarantors. In January 1988, the bank accelerated the
balance due on the note, notified the borrower and the guarantors, and
gave the borrower the option of paying the balance with interest on
March 30, 1988 or renewing the loan on that date. The borrower and the
bank chose to renew the loan without the guarantors' knowledge or sig-
natures. On August 10, 1988, the borrower obtained the guarantors' sig-
natures on the renewed loan. The loan eventually went into default
again, and the bank sued to enforce the note. The guarantors defended
on the ground that their guaranty was unenforceable for lack of
consideration. 10
The court agreed with the guarantors. The court reasoned that consid-
eration is sufficient if the promise to become a surety or guarantor on a
debt is made at or before the time the debt is created, but any subsequent
guaranty made independently of the initial transaction must be supported
by new consideration distinct from that of the debt. Because the loan's
97. Id. at 413.
98. 170 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
99. Id. at 865.
100. 165 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. filed).
101. Id. at 367-68.
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renewal was a subsequent transaction and the guarantors did not promise
to guaranty the renewed loan before or at the time of renewal, there was
no consideration and the guarantors were not obligated on the renewed
loan.10 2
In First National Acceptance Co. v. Dixon,10 3 a maker executed a note
secured by a deed of trust on the maker's business property. However,
the payee gave no consideration for the note. A bank subsequently pur-
chased sixty installments of the note under an indorsement that read,
"Pay without recourse to the order of" the bank. Although the bank had
only purchased sixty payments, the indorsement purported to convey the
entire note. The bank eventually foreclosed and purchased the property,
securing the note at a trustee's sale. The maker sued the bank and the
payee to set aside the foreclosure sale and to void the note and sale for
lack of consideration. The trial court ruled in favor of the maker. 10 4
On appeal, the court held that the note was enforceable because the
bank was not subject to the maker's defenses. The court reasoned that
the transfer was not a mere assignment; rather, the bank was a holder in
due course because the payee negotiated the note by indorsement and
transfer of possession, and the parties clearly contemplated that the bank
would have the sole power to enforce the note, to foreclose, and to dis-
pose of the property after foreclosure. Although the bank only bought
the next sixty payments due on the note, neither the note nor the indorse-
ment indicated an attempt to transfer a partial interest. As indorsed and
transferred, the maker could have paid the note's entire amount to the
bank with perfect safety against any claim of the payee. The judgment
was reversed and the case was remanded.1 0 5
In EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Davis,10 6 a husband and wife obtained a
loan from a savings bank. When the bank failed, the note was transferred
several times and finally ended up in the hands of the defendant mort-
gage company. The note specified the amount, interest rate, starting
date, maturity date, and monthly payment, all of which were based on a
thirty-year amortization schedule. A capitalized statement at the top of
the note stated that its terms included a balloon payment at maturity, but
it contained no details about this provision. When the note was trans-
ferred to the holder, the holder refused to apply the balloon payment
provision. The borrowers ultimately paid the amount that the holder de-
manded and sued for the difference.
The borrowers alleged that the loan was structured as a fifteen-year
loan with a balloon payment at maturity, with payments based on a
thirty-year amortization schedule. The borrowers had received and
signed several disclosures at the same time that they executed the note,
102. Id. at 370.
103. 154 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied).
104. Id. at 219-22.
105. Id. at 225.
106. 167 S.W.3d 406 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied).
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which showed the intent of the parties to structure the loan as the bor-
rowers alleged. The disclosures accompanied the note and were known
to the holder before the purchase. The holder argued that all of the
loan's terms were clear on its face, which showed that it was simply a
thirty-year amortizing loan. Over the holder's objection, the trial court
admitted the disclosures, and a jury found in favor of the borrowers. The
holder appealed. 10 7
On appeal, the court held that the signed disclosures defining the
note's balloon-payment obligation and the balloon-payment requirement
were sufficient to show that the note was ambiguous as to the loan's
structure.108 The holder argued that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and
its statutory counterpart protected it from the separate agreement defin-
ing the balloon payment's calculation.10 9 The court disagreed, holding
that the balloon-payment disclosure agreements and other extraneous in-
formation were not being used as a defense to paying the note but in-
stead, to clarify and explain an ambiguity in the note. Thus, the doctrine
did not apply." 0 The court also held that because the holder knew of the
disclosures before it purchased the note, it had knowledge of the balloon-
payment requirement, negating any argument about the doctrine's appli-
cability due to lack of notice."' For similar reasons, the court held that
the Code's holder-in-due-course provisions made the holder subject to
claims and defenses apparent on the face of the instrument, which in-
cluded notice of the ambiguous balloon-payment provision. 112 The judg-
ment of the trial court was affirmed." 3
In Wheeler v. Security State Bank, N.A., 1 1 4 a bank sued to recover on
two promissory notes. The maker alleged that he did not sign the larger
of the two notes, but he did not make this allegation by a verified plead-
ing. The bank moved for summary judgment (1) by attaching photo-
copies of the notes to its motion, (2) by an affidavit of a bank officer who
testified that the maker executed and delivered the notes to the bank, (3)
by stating under the same affidavit that the maker signed the note, and
(4) by stating the balance due on the note and the reasonable and neces-
sary attorney's fees required for the note's collection. Because the maker
only contested his signature's validity, but did not do so by a verified
pleading, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the bank." 5
107. Id. at 410-12.
108. Id. at 415.
109. The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine is derived from D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447 (1942). The doctrine "is a rule of estoppel that precludes a borrower
from asserting defenses ... that are based either on secret or unrecorded agreements that
alter the terms of an obligation." EMC Mortgage, 167 S.W.3d at 416. The doctrine's statu-
tory counterpart appears in 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
110. EMC Mortgage, 167 S.W.3d at 417.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 415 n.5.
113. Id. at 419-20.
114. 159 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet. h.).
115. Id. at 755 n.1, 757.
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On appeal, the court held that the maker's failure to respond to the
motion for summary judgment allowed the maker to raise only a single
issue, that is, that the proof supporting the motion for summary judgment
was insufficient as a matter of law. 116 Because the maker failed to file a
verified pleading contesting his signature, his signature's validity was fully
proved. None of the other elements of the bank's summary-judgment
proof had been contested below, so judgment in favor of the bank was
affirmed. 117
In Duong v. Bank One, N.A., 118 an employee of a law firm and trans-
lating service fraudulently indorsed twenty-eight checks made payable to
the attorneys and their clients and indorsed one check issued in his em-
ployer's name. He then converted the checks by depositing them into an
account he opened in his employer's name. When the law firm sued the
bank for conversion, the bank requested that the firm stipulate that the
employee had authority to supply the bank with the payees' names and
addresses. When the law firm responded, the bank contended that it had
proven the "faithless employee defense" under section 3.405 of the Code
as a matter of law. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the
bank. 119
The court of appeals held that the bank did not prove the faithless-
employee defense as a matter of law except for one of the checks. The
court described the faithless-employee defense as one that adopts a com-
parative-negligence system to allocate responsibility between an em-
ployer and a bank when the employer has entrusted the employee with
responsibility for instruments. 120 Reviewing the official comment to sec-
tion 3.405, the court noted the Code's distinction between checks made
payable to the employer and those issued by the employer.' 21 The court
held that section 3.405 applied to the latter but not to the former, and any
admission made by the law firm would be effective only with respect to
the one check it had issued. The bank was required, therefore, to prove
the faithless-employee defense with respect to the twenty-eight checks
made payable to the employer. 122
In Bank of America, N.A. v. Amarillo National Bank,123 an unknown
person created a check that resembled a company's legitimate checks.
The counterfeit check differed from the real checks in paper and size, but
the counterfeit bore a check number that was the same as the check num-
ber of a real check that the company actually issued. The payee named
on the counterfeit check deposited the check in his account at the deposi-
tary bank, and the payor bank paid it. Upon reviewing its bank state-
116. Id. at 757.
117. Id. at 758.
118. 169 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
119. Id. at 248-49.
120. Id. at 250.
121. Id. at 252 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.405 cmt. 1 (Vernon 2002)).
122. Id. at 352-54.
123. 156 S.W.3d 108 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet. h.).
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ment, the company discovered the counterfeit and notified the bank. The
company's account was recredited. The payor bank sought recovery from
the depositary bank under section 4.208 of the Code for breaching its
warranty against alteration.2 4 The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the payor bank, and the depositary bank appealed. 125
The court of appeals reviewed the Code's definition of "alteration" and
concluded that the term "presupposes the existence of an instrument. '126
The definition also connoted "a change to, or on, that preexisting instru-
ment. ' 127 Drawing an artistic analogy, the court then said, "If change is
being done 'to an instrument,' reason suggests that the physical instru-
ment itself undergo change, not some other document. For instance,
there is but one 'Mona Lisa.' While it may be subject to alteration, one
does not do so by making a copy of the masterpiece and then changing
the confident smile of the woman appearing in the copy."'128 Citing earlier
cases dealing with counterfeit checks, the court held that an alteration
must "be made on the body of the original instrument, as opposed to
appearing simply on a copy of the original."1 29 Simply because the coun-
terfeit happened to bear a check number that was the same as the num-
ber of an actual check did not turn the counterfeit into an altered
instrument. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the payor bank
was reversed, and a take-nothing judgment was rendered on the breach-
of-warranty claim. 130
In Time Out Grocery v. Vanguard Group, Inc.,131 a drawer issued a
check to a payee who indorsed it to a grocery store. The drawer stopped
payment on the check, and the check was dishonored when presented.
The holder sued the drawer for the check's amount, a statutory fee for
the returned check, and attorney's fees. The claim for attorney's fees was
based on Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provisions allowing
recovery of attorney's fees in actions founded on an oral or written
contract. 1
32
The court denied recovery of attorney's fees on the ground that the
holder's claim was not "contractual in nature."'1 33 The court distin-
guished several cases relied on by the plaintiff because they did not in-
124. Id. at 109-10 (discussing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.417(a), 4.208(a)
(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005)). Sections 3.417(a) and 4.206(a) require that a presenting
bank and prior transferors give four different warranties to a payor bank. The warranty
given under sections 3.417(a)(2) and 4.208(a)(2) is that a draft (which includes a check) has
not been altered.
125. Bank of Am., 156 S.W.3d at 110.
126. Id. at 111 (discussing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.407 (Vernon 2002)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Charter Bank Nw. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1986);
Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 02-C-186, 2004 WL 1323942 (N.D. Ill.
June 14, 2004)).
130. Id. at 112.
131. 187 S.W.3d 41 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
132. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1997)).
133. Id. at 45.
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volve actions on negotiable instruments. Of particular note, however,
was the basis on which the court distinguished Barham v. Sugar Creek
National Bank 34-Barham was a case in which an indorsee sued a prior
indorser, whereas the case at bar was one in which the payee was suing
the drawer.135 This distinction seems strained at best, particularly since
the sections dealing with drawer and indorser liability that were in effect
when Barham was decided were titled, respectively, "Contract of Maker,
Drawer and Acceptor" and "Contract of Indorser; Order of Liability. 1 36
The court failed to note this parallelism under the former version of Arti-
cle 3. Nonetheless, the court held that Barham did not support the plain-
tiff's claim against the drawer as a contract action.1 37 The court also
distinguished Compass Bank v. Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc. 138 because that
case involved the liability of a bank as the drawer of a cashier's check. 139
In distinguishing Compass Bank, as it did with Barham, the court did not
note the parallelism between the sections dealing with indorser and
drawer liability, including a bank's liability as drawer of a cashier's check.
Under the 1995 revision of Chapter 3, which became effective in Texas on
January 1, 1996, the sections dealing with the liability of drawers and in-
dorsers were retitled as "Obligation of Drawer" and "Obligation of In-
dorser."'140 The provisions dealing with banks as the drawers of cashier's
checks were restated in a separate section titled "Obligation of Issuer of
Note or Cashier's Check.' 4 1 Given that the 1995 change from "Con-
tract" to "Obligation" in the titles of these sections might imply a change
in the basis of an action, the court did not rely on this (and, indeed, the
change seems to be nothing but a stylistic rewording since the substance
of these sections was not changed). The court in Compass Bank made
nothing turn on use of the word "obligation" instead of "contract."
Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of the
check and for the returned check charge, but no recovery was allowed for
attorney's fees. 142 At best, the decision in Time Out Grocery is suspect
and, more likely, simply wrong.
IV. DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
A. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
As with Chapter 3, the principal developments dealing with documents
of title were the legislative changes made in Chapter 7 of the Code. Un-
like the relatively few amendments to Chapter 3, Chapter 7 was com-
pletely revised to modernize its treatment of warehouse receipts, bills of
134. 612 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
135. Time Out Grocery, 187 S.W.3d at 44.
136. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.413-.414 (Vernon 1968) (emphasis added).
137. See Time Out Grocery, 187 S.W.3d at 44.
138. No. 05-00-01803-CV, 2001 WL 1486199 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 26, 2001, no pet.).
139. Time Out Grocery, 187 S.W.3d at 45.
140. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.414-.415 (Vernon 2002).
141. See id. § 3.412.
142. Time Out Grocery, 187 S.W.3d at 45.
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lading, and other documents of title issued by a carrier or warehouse to
represent goods that are in shipment or in storage. 143 A "certificate of
title" is not a "document of title" since it is used to record ownership and
security interests in certain types of property, primarily motor vehicles,
and is issued by a state agency rather than a person in the business of
shipping or storing goods for hire.144
While bills of lading and warehouse receipts have similar characteris-
tics in that both are issued by bailees for hire who are in the business of
shipping or storing goods, they also have some differences. For this rea-
son, Chapter 7 includes several provisions applicable to both types of
documents and other provisions dealing separately with bills of lading
and warehouse receipts. Subchapters 1, 4, 5, and 6 deal with documents
of title in general.145 Special provisions covering warehouse receipts are
contained in Subchapter 2, and Subchapter 3 does the same for bills of
lading.146
Chapter 7 deals only with the civil issues surrounding the issuance and
use of documents of title. It does not deal with regulatory or criminal
matters concerning shipping or warehousing, including laws prescribing
the form or content of a document of title or the services or facilities
required of bailees. 147 Chapter 7 is subject to any treaty or statute of the
United States to the extent such statute is applicable to a transaction. 148
Chapter 7 was part of the Code when it was first adopted in Texas and
remained essentially unchanged until 2005, when Texas adopted the 2003
revision of the Official Text.149 While many of the rules dealing with
warehouse receipts and bills of lading remain the same, there are a num-
ber of significant changes. First, and perhaps foremost, is the statutory
recognition of electronic documents of title.150 Under the former Chapter
7, many of the rights and liabilities depended upon possession of a negoti-
able document of title in written form or written instructions delivered to
a carrier or warehouse. Under revised Chapter 7, written documents of
title continue to exist, but the intangible nature of electronic documents
143. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 7.101-.106, 7.201-.210, 7.301-.309, 7.401-.404,
7.501-.509, 7.601-.603 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
144. For purposes of perfecting a security in a secured transaction, certificates of title
are defined in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(10) (Vernon 2002), and the
method of perfection is specified in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(c)(2) (Vernon
2002).
145. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 7.101-.106, 7.401-.404, 7.501-.509, 7.601-.603
(Vernon Supp. 2005).
146. Id. §§ 7.201-.210, 7.301-.309.
147. Id. § 7.103.
148. Id. Federal laws with preemptive effect include the Federal Bills of Lading Act, 49
U.S.C. § 80101 et seq. (2000); Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11707 (2000); Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (2000); United States Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 241 et seq. (2000).
149. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
150. Because the recognition of electronic documents of title not only affects provisions
in Chapter 7 but also has an impact on Sales and Secured Transaction, the definitions in
Chapter 1 were amended to make the concept applicable throughout the Code. See TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(6), (16), (31), (42) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
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of title required inclusion of the concept of "control" to determine the
rights of parties dealing with electronic documents. Under section 7.106,
a person has control of an electronic document of title if a system exists
for evidencing the issue and transfer of the document and the system pro-
vides for the retention of a single authoritative copy and a means by
which the person in control must consent to any modifications or trans-
fers. 5 1 By conforming amendments to Chapter 9, control of an electronic
document of title is also a proper means of perfecting a security interest
in the document.152
Other changes in Chapter 7 are summarized in the Prefatory Note ac-
companying the Official Text of the revision.' 53 These include new defi-
nitions, clarifications, deletions, broadening rights, conforming language
to modern practice, adding references, giving courts greater flexibility,
and conforming to the U.C.C. 54
V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. SCOPE OF A SECURITY INTEREST
In First Union National Bank v. Richmont Capital Partners I, L.P.,155 a
debtor borrowed money from a bank ("Bank A") under a security agree-
ment granting Bank A a security interest in most of the debtor's assets.
This loan exceeded $34 million. The debtor later obtained additional fi-
nancing in the amount of $50 million from another bank ("Bank B") by
granting a security interest in the same collateral and by having a guaran-
tor provide a guaranty of $10 million of the $50 million amount. The
banks entered into an intercreditor agreement, establishing their priori-
ties and order of payment in the collateral. The guarantor was not a party
to this agreement, and rights in the guaranty were not specifically men-
tioned in the agreement. When the debtor eventually needed more
money, the intercreditor agreement was amended in a series of compli-
cated amendments, but, like the original agreement, the guaranty was not
specifically mentioned and the guarantor was not a party to the
amendments.156
The debtor ultimately filed for bankruptcy, triggering an action by
Bank B. Bank A intervened, claiming it had a right to payment under the
guaranty on three different grounds: (1) it had a security interest in the
guaranty under the intercreditor agreement; (2) it was a third-party bene-
ficiary under the guaranty; and (3) the guarantor was unjustly enriched by
a settlement with the Bank B limiting the guarantor's liability to $7.8 mil-
lion. The trial court granted summary judgment and ordered that the
151. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 7.106 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
152. See id. § 9.310(b)(8) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
153. U.C.C., Official Text and Comments, Article 7 Prefatory Note, 698 (West 2004).
154. Id.
155. 168 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
156. Id. at 921.
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intervenor take nothing on any of its claims.157
On appeal, the court noted that under Texas law, a guaranty agreement
is construed strictly in favor of the guarantor. 158 Reviewing the inter-
creditor agreements and the subsequent amendments in this light, the
court held that the guaranty was not "collateral" in which Bank A had a
security interest under the intercreditor agreement. 159 Similarly, none of
the various agreements indicated an intent to make Bank A either a do-
nee or a creditor beneficiary, and the court rejected the third-party bene-
ficiary claim.160 As to the unjust-enrichment claim, the court pointed out
that Bank A could have bargained to give the itself an express interest in
the guaranty, and the theory of unjust enrichment could not be used to
rescue Bank A from a bad bargain.16 1 The judgment of the trial court
was therefore affirmed. 162
In Calpine Producer Services, L.P. v. Wiser Oil Co.,' 63 the court ad-
dressed a case arising from the ripple effect of the Enron failure. A natu-
ral-gas producer sued a natural-gas reseller for breach of contract when
the reseller failed to pay for gas it had purchased from the producer and
resold to Enron. The dispute hinged on a contract provision stating that
payment was due after the reseller "receives payment from its custom-
ers."'1 64 The reseller argued that this language was a condition precedent
to its duty to pay, and, since it had not been paid by its customer, its
obligation to pay the producer never arose. The producer argued that
this language should not be interpreted as an absolute condition but as a
statement that payment was to be made within a reasonable time after
the reseller sold the gas. The producer also argued that it had a security
interest under section 9.343 of the Code to secure the obligation to pay
for the gas, and this indicated a legislative intent to protect producers by
assuring that purchasers paid.' 65 Even though conditions are not favored
under Texas law, the court nonetheless held that the contract's express
language could not be construed to mean that payment was due after the
reseller should have received payment from its customers.1 66 As to the
security interest under section 9.343, the court reasoned that the security
interest only arose when a right to payment existed, and no right existed
because payment had not been made. Because the reseller had not
breached the contract by failing to pay when it did not receive payment
from its own customer, no right to payment accrued to support the statu-
tory security interest. 167
157. Id. at 922-23.
158. Id. at 924.
159. Id. at 928.
160. Id. at 930.
161. Id. at 932.
162. Id.
163. 169 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
164. Id. at 788.
165. Id. (discussing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.343 (Vernon 2002)).




Under Chapter 9, the terms "debtor" and "obligor" are separately de-
fined. 168 A "debtor" is a person having an ownership interest in collat-
eral. An "obligor" is a person who owes payment on or performance of
the obligation. 169 The same person may be both a "debtor" and an "obli-
gor," or the debtor and obligor may be different persons. An example of
the latter situation appeared in Wagner v. Compass Bank,170 in which a
company (the "obligor") obtained a loan by using its own inventory as
collateral and by granting a security interest in shares of stock in another
company that were owned by an individual who was a co-owner of the
company (the "debtor"). The security agreement provided that all of the
collateral secured not only the initial loan, but also any future advances
made to the company. Additional advances were made over a period of
time. 171
When the company defaulted, instead of liquidating the inventory, the
secured party sold enough of the debtor's collateral to satisfy the debt
and returned the balance to the debtor.172 The debtor contended that the
secured party had acted improperly by liquidating the debtor's collateral
and applying the proceeds to pay subsequent loans to the obligor. 173 The
court held that the security agreement signed by the debtor provided that
the debtor's collateral secured both present and future advances made to
the obligor and did not require that the secured party first liquidate the
inventory.1 74 The debtor also argued that his liability under a guaranty he
had signed in connection with the loans was limited to $50,000, and the
amount realized from the liquidated collateral exceeded this amount.
The court agreed that the debtor's personal liability was limited to
$50,000 but pointed out that the limitation of personal liability did not
operate to limit secured party's right to liquidate collateral.1 75 The court
concluded that the secured party had proven the amount of the debt and,
under the terms of the security agreement, had the right to liquidate any
of the collateral securing the debt.176
B. PERFECTING A SECURITY INTEREST
Although not arising under the Texas U.C.C., the decision in In re
Spearing Tool & Manufacturing Co., deserves mention. 177 Under section
9.310 of the Code, a financing statement must be filed to perfect a secur-
168. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(28), (60) (Vernon 2002).
169. Id.
170. 170 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
171. Id. at 221-22.
172. Although not mentioned in the opinion, the secured party probably determined
that it was easier to sell the debtor's stock on the stock market than it was to repossess and
dispose of the obligor's inventory because the disposition requirements for collateral sold
in a recognized market are less stringent than those for other types of collateral. See TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.611(d) (Vernon 2002).
173. Wagner, 170 S.W.3d at 222.
174. Id. at 225.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 226.
177. 412 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2005).
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ity interest except for certain limited situations listed in that section.178
Under section 9.509 of the Code, if a debtor is a registered organization
(corporation, for example), the financing statement must provide the or-
ganization's name as indicated in the public records of the jurisdiction
where the debtor is organized. 179 In Spearing Tool, the Internal Revenue
Service filed a notice of federal tax lien identifying the delinquent tax-
payer as "Spearing Tool & Mfg. Company, Inc." instead of the registered
organization name "Spearing Tool and Manufacturing Co."' 80 In a prior-
ity dispute between a secured party that had filed under the registered
organization name and the IRS, the bankruptcy court found in favor of
the IRS, and the district court reversed. 181 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit,
the court held that the IRS filing was sufficient as a matter of federal law
under the Federal Tax Lien Act, which provides that the form and con-
tent of a notice of tax lien "shall be prescribed by the [Treasury] Secre-
tary" and "be valid notwithstanding any other provision of law regarding
the form or content of a notice of lien."' 82
The secured party argued, and the court agreed, that the electronic-
search capabilities of the Michigan filing system placed limitations on
creditors's ability to locate filings that varied from the registered organi-
zation's name. Nonetheless, the court held that the secured party should
have searched for variations on the registered name, particularly since the
abbreviation of "Mfg." and the use of an ampersand in place of "and" are
common.183 Furthermore, the Michigan Secretary of State had suggested
that the secured party search using these abbreviations, and the secured
party failed to do S0.184
The court also rejected an argument that it is unreasonable to require a
secured party to make multiple searches when the name of a debtor can
be abbreviated in several ways. On this point, the secured party submit-
ted an example using the name "ABCD Christian Brothers Construction
and Development Company of Michigan, Inc." and 288 possible abbrevi-
ations of that name. Describing this as "an extreme example," the court
pointed out that, in the case at bar, "only two relevant words could be,
and commonly are, abbreviated: 'Manufacturing' and 'and'-and the Sec-
retary of State specifically recommended searching for those abbrevia-
tions."'1 85 The court added, "We express no opinion about whether
creditors have a general obligation to search name variations. Our hold-
ing is limited to these facts.' 86
178. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.310 (Vernon 2002).
179. See id. § 9.503(a)(1).
180. Spearing Tool, 412 F.3d at 654.
181. In re Spearing Tool & Mfg. Co., 292 B.R. 579 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003), rev'd, 412
F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2005).
182. Spearing Tool, 412 F.3d at 655 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(3) (2000)).






Spearing Tool points out the need for a secured party to recognize that
a search of U.C.C. filings should take federal law into account, since the
standards for federal tax lien filings, according to the Sixth Circuit, are
less stringent that those required by section 9.509 of the Code and allow
variations on a registered organization's name from that appearing on the
public record. 18 7 It should be noted, however, that the search systems
used for U.C.C. filings are not uniform from one state to another. Some
systems may automatically search for name variations or common abbre-
viations; others may not. Obtaining information from the administrator
of a particular state's search system about the system's capabilities can be
a worthwhile endeavor for a secured party.
187. See id. at 656-57.
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